Summary

The court declined to make a supplementary declaration clarifying its existing declarations in a claim regarding the chairmanship of the Libyan Investment Authority.

Facts

The court gave a supplementary judgment to its decision ([2019] EWHC 306 (Comm), [2019] 2 WLUK 254) on preliminary issues in a claim regarding the chairmanship of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA).

The claimant claimed declaratory relief that he, and not the first respondent (B), was the validly appointed chairman, having been appointed in accordance with Libya's law no.13 of 2010, which provided for the LIA to have a board of trustees with power to appoint its chairman. The body known as the Government of National Accord (GNA) had appointed trustees, who had appointed the claimant. B claimed to have been appointed chairman by a different body. Law no.13 referred to the trustees being appointed by the General People's Committee (GPC), which no longer existed. The court determined and declared as preliminary issues that the question of which body represented the government of Libya fell to be determined under English law, and that the government of Libya was represented by the GNA.

B invited the court to make a supplementary declaration clarifying whether or not its existing declarations decided whether an English court was precluded from considering whether the GNA lacked the power under Libyan law to appoint the LIA's board of trustees.

Held

B had failed to identify why the issue might arise. If law no.13's references to the GPC were to be interpreted as references to the government of Libya from time to time, the question of whether law no.13 conferred on the GNA the power of appointment of trustees became the question of whether the GNA was the government of Libya, and that question had been answered in the affirmative by the existing declarations. B's argument was allied to his assertion that he had not conceded that, in the absence of a GPC, the body with power under law no.13 to appoint the trustees was the government from time to time. However, he had conceded precisely that. B's pleaded case had not been that references to the GPC were not to the government from time to time, but that the question of who the government was depended on Libyan law. The existing declarations had resolved that, contrary to B's pleaded case, the question of who the government was did not depend on Libyan law, and, on the facts, the government was the GNA. It did not resolve the question of whether the references to the GPC were to the government. Whether the issue B identified would arise depended on what case B pleaded as to why, although the GNA was the government, the claimant had not been validly appointed as chairman. No further declaration would be granted (see paras 10-16 of judgment).

Judgment accordingly